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NOTE
TO INCORPORATE OR NOT TO INCORPORATE THAT IS THE QUESTION: HOW STATE V.
CUSTARD CLARIFIED CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
LAUREN

J. ALLEN*

INTRODUCTION

As the business arena in North Carolina is rapidly evolving in numerous forms, shapes, and sizes, it is much more important to make
sure the laws are precise and clear for those who decide to start a
business entity in North Carolina. Venturing into the business sector
can be a scary situation and there are many risks involved if not done
correctly. The economic crisis that began in 2008 has impacted the
entire nation and is a reflection of those that made extremely poor
business decisions. If you are a business lawyer in North Carolina,
then you understand the importance of keeping a copy of Robinson
on North CarolinaCorporationLaw (Robinson) with you at all times,
and to cherish it during your years as a practicing attorney like you
would your Bible or any other sacred literature.' Robinson is a "treatise that occupies a prominent shelf in every North Carolina business
lawyer's library."2
After a thorough and lengthy reading of Judge Tennille's opinion
for State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, you would do yourself an
injustice not to include this highly informative piece with your "Corporation Bible."' The North Carolina Business Court Judge detailed
the importance of corporate governance in this complex business case
* B.A., North Carolina State University, Communication Media with a minor in Journalism, 2006; J.D. (cand.) North Carolina Central University School of Law, 2012. I would like to
dedicate this casenote to my father, Douglas A. Allen, and in loving memory of my mother,
Cheryl H. Allen.
1. John Buford, Business CourtBlockbuster: If You Only Read One Corporate Governance

Case This Year, Make It This One, North Carolina Business Litigation Report (March 21, 2010),
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.comltags/business-judgment-rule/ and RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINsON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW (Matthew Bender, 7th ed. 2009).
2. Buford, supra note 1.
3. State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 $1 1-70 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19,
2010).
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and finally answered some legal issues that were of first impression in
North Carolina.
For many years, the majority of states, including North Carolina,
have looked to the premier Delaware business courts for guidance in
their judicial interpretation of challenging business issues.' Delaware
became the leading authority due to its favorable laws for incorporation, which lured an astonishing number of businesses to incorporate
there. This has given the Delaware courts an advantage over the
other state courts by allowing them more opportunities to handle legal
issues that arise in business law. Custardexamines some of these difficult legal issues left unanswered by Robinson which include: (1) what
does a breach of a fiduciary duty by a director or officer look like; (2)
is there a difference in determining directors' duties based on particular industries; (3) what standard is applied for the business judgment
rule; (4) is the gross negligence standard used in North Carolina corporation law; and (5) is good faith a separate duty or an element of a
duty of loyalty or a duty of care?5 While Delaware corporate law has
and will remain as one of the best sources of authority to refer to
when establishing the law in North Carolina, Custard sets precedence
for those that decide to incorporate in North Carolina. Judge Tennille's interpretation of the North Carolina General Statutes in Custard provides a clearer representation of North Carolina corporation
law. Finally, Custardpushed North Carolina corporation law out from
behind the shadows of the Delaware decisions.
This is an informative note which considers the significance of looking at decisions of corporate governance in North Carolina rather
than strictly focusing on Delaware decisions. Prior case law has left
business lawyers in North Carolina with no other choice but to rely on
the outcomes in Delaware law. At some point, we have to look upon
our North Carolina cases, precedence, and authoritative sources to
make our law clear for those who decide to incorporate in North Carolina. This note focuses on the importance of the North Carolina Business Court and the implications of Robinson prior to this decision.
Next, it clarifies and expands on some unanswered questions from
Robinson on the fiduciary duties of officers and directors in a corporation. The Custard decision declares that different industries determine different directors' duties, the business judgment rule is a gross
negligence standard, and good faith is not a separate duty but rather
an element of a duty of loyalty or a duty of care. Finally, this note will
show how Judge Tennille's decision in Custard enhances the judicial
4. Id.

9 48.

5. Id. T 58.
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interpretation that is already found in Robinson and provides case authority that will assist similarly situated lawyers in the future.
THE CASE

On March 31, 2006, the plaintiff, James E. Long, filed in the North
Carolina Superior Court in the Tenth Judicial District of Wake
County, but was subsequently transferred to the North Carolina Business Court where Judge Tennille presided over the case due to its
complex business issues.' Robinson on North Carolina Corporation
Law states:
The equally important purposes of the Business Court are, first, to
establish an expert forum that can expeditiously resolve complex corporate and other business disputes and, second, by requiring a written
opinion in every case, to create a larger body of case law that will
result in greater certainty and predictability for business decision
making.
The plaintiff, James E. Long (Mr. Long), was the North Carolina
Commissioner of Insurance and the liquidator of Commercial Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC) of North Carolina.' Prior to this
suit, CCIC was forced into liquidation after becoming insolvent as a
result of poor decisions and was over sought by Mr. Long of the North
Carolina Department of Insurance (NCDOI). CCIC was a property
and liability insurance company that originally formed in Georgia, but
re-domesticated to North Carolina on December 21, 2001.10 The defendants, collectively as "individual Defendants," were Richard and
Wendy Custard, Nimocks Haigh, and Delta Insurance Services, Inc."
Mr. and Mrs. Custard, along with Mr. Haigh were members of the
board of directors and officers at CCIC.12 Delta owned the outstanding stock in CCIC and the above named defendants were also board
members, officers, and shareholders of Delta.' "The Custards also
owned and controlled Custard Insurance Adjusters (CIA), a company
that adjusted property and casualty insurance claims for companies
nationwide" which included a majority of CCIC's claims.14
During Mr. Long's investigation, he found that the individual Defendants "directed the business of CCIC in such a way as to promote
the best interests of CIA and in disregard of the interests of CCIC
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. 6.
RoBINSON, supra note 1, § 1.04[2].
Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
25-8.
Id.
Id. J 23.
Id.
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shareholders and policyholders.""s Mr. Long brought this suit on behalf of the creditors and policyholders of CCIC to recover money
judgments from a loan of funds, termination payments, and a breach
of fiduciary duties by the individual Defendants in their capacity as
directors/officers at CCIC.16 NCDOI based its theory of liability on
the fact that the individual Defendants showed bad faith or a lack of
good faith when they filed CCIC's monthly reports with NCDOI and
when they continued to sell a high volume of artisan insurance policies
even though there was evidence of extreme losses on these policies."
The only prior history was the opinion by Judge Tennille on the
individual Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on
August 8, 2007.18 On July 15, 2009, the individual Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment which this opinion is in response of
that motion.19 Judge Tennille granted the individual Defendants' motion for summary judgment in regards to the claims for breach of fiduciary duties as the final outcome for Custard.2 0
BACKGROUND

"For more than 30 years, Robinson on North Carolina Corporation
Law has been the authoritative reference on corporation law in North
Carolina." 2 ' According to LexisNexis, "it provides complete coverage
of significant case law developments, placing a special emphasis on
corporate control and governance."2 2 Russell M. Robinson, II is the
author of this significant treatise and is a well-known, leading authority on North Carolina business corporation law.2 3 In referring to
Robinson in this section of the note, the implications and results derive from Robinson prior to the 2010 Custard decision.24
Before the March 19, 2010 opinion, Robinson could only rely on the
August 8, 2007 Custard opinion for Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for its implications of statutes of limitations in
regards to the breaches of duty of care and loyalty.25 In regards to this
15.
16.
17.
18.
2007).
19.
20.

9.
20.
9 10.
State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, 2007 NCBC 26 1 1-35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8,
Id.
Id.
Id.

Custard, 2010 NCBC 6
Id. 1 178.

3.

21. Robinson on North Carolina Corporation Law, LEXISNEXIS.COM, http://www.lexisnexis.

com/store/catalog/booktemplate/productdetail.jsp?pageName=relatedProducts&catld=&prodld
=7236# (last visited April 6, 2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. RoslNsoN, supra note 1.
25. Id. § 17.07[1].
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implication, Robinson explained, "the prevailing view holds that the
applicable period of limitations is determined by the nature of the
wrong complained of, not by the nature of the suit as being derivative
or the general nature of the directors' duties as being fiduciary. "26
This view derived from the prior case law of Custard, in "applying
three-year period in action under insurance statute against directors of
insurance company for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty." 27 However, as a result of the Court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's prior case law claims in Custard,this present case arose to
answer those claims.2 8 Judge Tennille pointed out that Robinson left
four unanswered questions "about fiduciary duties of officers and directors" in North Carolina which include whether there is "a separate
duty of good faith under North Carolina law," whether different directors can "be held to different standards of care," whether "directors in
different kinds of companies [could] be held to different standards of
care," and whether "the standard of review under the duty of care [is]
'negligence' or 'gross negligence'" 29 According to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-8-30(a), "a director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) [i]n good faith; (2)
[w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) [i]n a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."3 0 Thus,
this applicable statute for the general standards for directors imposes
a duty of good faith, care, and loyalty.3 '
Prior to the 2010 Custard decision, it was unclear whether or not
there was a separate duty of good faith under North Carolina law.32
In referring to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-8-30(a)(1), Robinson states, "[t]he
requirement of good faith is listed separately in the statute and has
occasionally been cited as a separate duty apart from the duties of due
care and loyalty.

. . ."

While there are several notable cases used

throughout Robinson to express opinions of differing views when it
comes to the "duty of good faith" as a separate duty from the duty of
care or loyalty, these cases are based on Delaware law.34 Thus,
Robinson concluded that "the North Carolina courts have not yet de26. Id.

27. Id. (quoting State v. Custard, 2007 NCBC 26, n.6).
28. State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, 2010 NCBC 6
2010).

1 1-70 (N.C. Super. Ct. March 19,

29. Id. 58 n.16 (quoting RoBINSoN, supra note 1,§ 14.03[1]).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (2010).
31. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 14.02, see id.
32. Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 31.
33. RomNsoN, supra note 1, §14.02 (citing § 55-8-30(a)).
34. Id. (citing In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996), Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
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fined whether and to what extent a director may be held liable under
the duty of good faith for conduct that may not precisely constitute
disloyalty or lack of due care.""
Prior to the 2010 Custard decision, Robinson could not answer
whether or not different directors in the same company or directors in
different kinds of companies could be held to different standards of
care under North Carolina law.3 6 These two issues were paired together because they have very similar reasonings in their decisions
and authority found prior to Judge Tennille's opinion. In referring to
the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-8-30(a)(2), "this formulation of the standard
of care in terms of a "prudent person" acting under "similar circumstances" raises the question whether the test is a fixed standard of
prudence applicable to all directors and all corporations alike or
whether it may be higher for some corporations and directors than for
others."" Some courts throughout the United States have the view
that when it comes to different directors in the same company, the
standard of care will vary based on that individual director's experience and reputation.38 Robinson goes on to state that even though
certain directors will have differing duties and may even discharge
their duties to outside advisors, directors as a whole are "under a
"duty of reasonable inquiry" to inform themselves as to the condition
of the corporation and the conduct of its affairs; it is no excuse for
them to say that they had no knowledge of the mismanagement or
fraud that reasonable attention to those affairs would have disclosed." 39 Many of the earlier decisions in North Carolina stem on a
bank director's liability "who might be held to higher standards of
conduct and broader liabilities than directors of ordinary corporations."4 0 It is important to note that these bank director decisions that
Robinson refers to occurred some one hundred years ago. 41 This just
goes to show the lack of relevant case authority in North Carolina
business law. "The North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that
there may be differences between the responsibilities of a bank director and a director of an ordinary corporation, which view seems supported by the words "like position" in the statute."42 Thus, in
referring to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-8-30(a)(2), Robinson concluded, "it is
arguable, however, that the 'like position' phrase refers only to the
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

supra note 1, §14.02.
Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 58.
ROBINsoN, supra note 1, § 14.03[1].
Id.
Id. § 14.0312].
ROBINSON,

40. Id.

§ 14.03[1].

41. Id.
42. Id.
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different duties of officers and directors, not to the different duties of
directors of different types of corporations."" 3
Prior to the 2010 Custard decision, Robinson could not answer
whether the standard of review under the duty of care was ordinary
negligence or gross negligence under North Carolina law." Instead,
Robinson relied on more Delaware decisions, like Smith v. Van
Gorkom, that pronounced that the applicable standard is "gross negligence."" 5 The Delaware courts reasoning on how to determine
whether the standard of review was gross negligence, depended on the
directors having an informed, rational basis for the operation of the
company like specific decisions or general monitoring.46 However,
there is one footnote referencing the North Carolina case of First
Union Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., which found that "the duty to act
on a fully informed basis is often stated as the prime duty of due
care," but does not make any other distinctions in relation to gross
negligence.47
Courts in other jurisdictions have drawn a distinction between (a) the
duty of care in making a specific decision, such as approving a transaction, for which the protection of the business judgment rule may be
available, and (b) the duty of care in the directors' general supervisory
or oversight performance, such as monitoring compliance with a policy
or legal requirements, for which the protection of the business judgment rule may not be available.48
"The North Carolina courts have not explicitly noted that distinction,
but the North Carolina decisions. . .clearly impose a duty of care on
the directors in monitoring the ongoing operation of the corporation
as well as in making decisions on particular matters."49 Thus, Robinson infers that even though there are no North Carolina decisions directly on point, "it appears likely from the language and background
of the North Carolina decisions that the North Carolina courts under
the Business Corporation Act would apply a standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances, rather than a lower 'gross negligence'
standard."o
43. Id. (referencing n.7).
44. State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 31 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010).
45. RoBmNsoN supra note 1, § 14.03[2] (referencing Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (referencing First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 NCBC 9A 1 32 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001)).
48. Id.§ 14.03[3] (referencing In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
49. Id. § 14.03[2].
50. Id.
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ANALYSIS

Custard required the North Carolina Business Court to examine an
insolvent insurance company's fiduciary principles "that fairly distinguish between director and officer conduct that involves (1) a breach
of the duty of loyalty that should be remediable by an award of monetary damages and (2) an exculpable or indemnifiable breach of the
duty of care."" North Carolina now has official case precedent in
dealing with directors' duties in corporation law. The North Carolina
Business Court made a decision in favor of the Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. After Judge Tennille's thorough assessment
of Custard, he stated that the Commissioner "failed to establish a
breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants" and "to establish evidence of
bad faith that would support an award of monetary damages."52
Judge Tennille came to his final decision after he reflected on a broad
timeline of the events that occurred leading up to the insolvency of
CCIC and the Commissioner's interference with the company's liquidation. Thus, Custardanswered, "significant questions concerning the
duties of officers and directors and to whom those duties are owed
and the standards of review applied by the courts" which is discussed
in this section.
The first unanswered question: Is there a separate duty of good
faith under North Carolina law?5 4 According to Judge Tennille, under
North Carolina law, "there is no duty of good faith separate and apart
from the duties of care and loyalty."5 5 Prior case decisions showed
difficulty in determining if good faith was in its own category and if a
plaintiff could sue a director after a finding of just bad faith. "The
North Carolina courts have not created a separate fiduciary duty of
good faith because it is not necessary and would create significant uncertainty under our law."5 6 Thus, good faith is not a separate duty
which resolves the confusion that existed with North Carolina's prior

law. 57

The second unanswered question: May different directors be held to
different standards of care?" According to Judge Tennille, under
North Carolina law, "different directors may be subject to differing
duties, at least based on their knowledge." 59 Each of the defendants
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

State ex rel. Comm'r Ins. v. Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010).
Id. 9 177.
Id. 3.
Id. 1 58 (referencing ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 14.03[1]).
Id. 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. 91
58 (referencing RoBINsoN, supra note 1 § 14.03[1]).
Id. 1 92 (referencing footnote 25 in Judge Tennille's opinion).
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in Custard had certain roles based on their individual expertise in the
company and each one of them discharged some aspect of their personal responsibilities to outside experts.6 0 In fact, two of the defendants relied on the information received from the other defendant
because of his specific role in the company. 61 North Carolina General
Statute § 55-8-30(b) states the following:
In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the
director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters
the director reasonably believes are within their professional or expert
competence; or
(3) A committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits
confidence.6 2
Ultimately, the information and reports used from these outside experts had a negative impact on the success of the company. 63 According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-8-30(c), "a director is not entitled to the
benefit of subsection (b) if he has actual knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted." 64 The Custard decision stated that different
directors in the company would be held to different standards of care
with respect to their individual knowledge and expertise.6 5 The two
defendants were entitled to rely on the judgment of the other defendant who in turn would be held to a different standard of care.6 6 That
one defendant was "Haigh, who was the principal manager of CCIC at
the time," and agreed with an outside expert's data.6 7 Judge Tennille
pointed out that "a director cannot rely on a report if she has actual
knowledge that it is inaccurate.""6 However, according to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 55-8-30(b), directors who rely on the professional expertise of
officers or outside advisors are given a statutory safe harbor in North
Carolina to protect them from potential liabilities.6 9 In Custard, all of
the defendants exercised their duty of care in good faith when they
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. T 88, 99.
Id. 91.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(b) (2010) (setting out general standards for directors).
Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 1 39.
§ 55-8-30(c) (setting out general standards for directors).
Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 1 42,
Id. 1 91.
Id.
Id. 1 92.
Id. 1 88.
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relied on the accuracy of the outside information and acted in the best
interests of the corporation.7 o Thus, since the one defendant had individual knowledge and expertise, he was held to a different standard of
care, but was found to meet that standard since it was done in good
faith and believed to be accurate information.'
The third unanswered question: May directors in different kinds of
companies be held to different standards of care?" According to
Judge Tennille, under North Carolina law, "directors in different kinds
of companies can have different duties."7 He went on to distinguish
that the earlier decisions referred only to bank directors having a separate and distinct standard of care, but now "conduct by directors of
an insurance company may be judged differently from conduct by directors of a textile company depending on the actions in question." 74
The Custard decision made it clear that the standard of care depends
on the specific context of the company in question and is always
changing.75 The proper standard of review in this case involved: "(1)
the operation of the business and the application of the corporate
charter's exculpatory provisions and (2) the director's duty to monitor." 76 Judge Tennille laid out the duties that need to be met in good
faith; for example, "officers and directors of insurance companies
have a duty to policyholders to act in such a manner as to avoid insolvency that would render the policies written worthless or substantially
diminished in value."7 7 If these officers or directors were to intentionally fail to act in accordance of this known duty to avoid insolvency,
then they would have demonstrated a conscious disregard for their
duties. Obviously, this conduct would entail a lack of good faith or
bad faith and "would take the directors outside the protection of the
exculpatory provisions of a corporate charter" and the presumption of
the business judgment rule that the Court allows.79 This presumption
of the business judgment rule means that "[a]s long as the process
employed by the officers and directors was rational and they believed
they were advancing the corporation's business, the Court will not second-guess their business decisions. . . ."so Judge Tennille concluded

that there was no evidence that the Defendants acted in bad faith "in
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. 1
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.

93.

96.
58 n.16 (referencing ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 14.03[1]).
69 n. 20.

53.
47.
69.

68.
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monitoring business risks" which is required for liability purposes.8 '
Thus, the standard of care in CCIC would be different than other
companies because the presumption of the business judgment rule is
based on the directors of CCIC's good-faith efforts in fulfilling the
necessary duties that an insurance company requires. 82
The final unanswered question: Is the standard of review under the
duty of care "negligence" or "gross negligence?"" According to
Judge Tennille, under North Carolina law, the standard of review for
this case is based on gross negligence because of the type of company
involved (insurance company) and the statutes in North Carolina that
recognize the risks involved with this type of company.8 In Custard,
there was "no showing of a conflict of interest or breach of fiduciary
duty of loyalty."" There was no evidence of "reckless indifference,
improper motive, personal advantage, or deliberate disregard of corporate interests."86 Thus, if there is no showing of bad faith and a selfinterest transaction, then the standard of review under the duty of
care is gross negligence in order to eliminate the presumption of the
business judgment rule." If there is a self-interest transaction, then
the standard of review under the duty of care is ordinary negligence in
order to eliminate the presumption of the business judgment rule. 8
The Commissioner in Custard had the burden to prove the higher
standard of review and was unsuccessful in doing so. 89 According to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-8-30(d), "a director is not liable for any action
taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed
the duties of his office in compliance with this section."90 Further,
"[t]he duties of a director weighing a change of control situation shall
not be any different, nor the standard of care any higher, than otherwise provided in this section."9 1 The Defendants acted in good faith
and there was no proof of a self-interest transaction which offered
them the presumption of the business judgment rule and their exculpating clause in their CCIC charter for their decisions even if they
were to be deemed to have mismanaged the company. Thus, the Custard decision established that regardless of the negative consequences
that occur as a result of bad decisions done in good faith and with no
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.C.
Id.

82.
59.
58 n. 16 (referencing ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 14.03[1]).
68-9.
87.
84.

86.
84.
GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(d) (2010) (setting out general standards for directors).
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self-interest in a transaction, a plaintiff must meet the gross negligence
standard.92
CONCLUSION

Judge Tennille's opinion in Custard answered four significant legal
issues that were of first impression in North Carolina corporation law
and emphasized the necessary requirements business lawyers must
prove in their claims for breaches of fiduciary duties. Under North
Carolina law, there is no separate duty of good faith, different directors may be held to different standards of care based on their knowledge, directors in different kinds of companies may be held to
different standards of care, and the standard of review under the duty
of care is gross negligence only when there is no self-interest transaction." The Custardopinion finally produced North Carolina case precedent that North Carolina lawyers can use rather than resorting only
to Delaware law, so make sure you keep a copy alongside your Robinson on North Carolina CorporationLaw. The Court ruled that there
was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the motion for summary judgment was granted in favor of the Defendants.9 4 In fact, the
Court found that "[a]ll the evidence supports a finding that Defendants were trying to run and build up a successful insurance
company."9 5
North Carolina courts should follow this case because we must start
relying on decisions and explanations that represent North Carolina
corporate law rather than the law of Delaware. We have become accustomed to following the business law decisions from the prestigious
Delaware Court of Chancery and even at times strictly resorting to
Delaware case law. The North Carolina Business Court was established in order to exemplify what North Carolina law does in certain
complex business issues and Judge Tennille's opinion in Custard has
given us an informative and precise interpretation of directors' duties
in corporate governance. At a time when economic resilience is crucial, how else will North Carolina attract new business entities to incorporate if we do not clarify North Carolina corporate governance
through our own case law?

92.
93.
94.
95.

Custard, 2010 NCBC 6 $ 84.
Id. 9 51-96.
Id. 1 177-178.
Id. 9 72.
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